Harden CI digest parsing and failure cleanup

include/Domito.MinCrypt.h

@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ typedef struct _MINCRYPT_POLICY_INFO
 
 #endif // NTDDI_VERSION >= NTDDI_WIN10
 
-}MINCRYPT_POLICY_INFO, PMINCRYPT_POLICY_INFO;
+}MINCRYPT_POLICY_INFO, *PMINCRYPT_POLICY_INFO;
 #include <poppack.h>
 
 
@@ -491,7 +491,10 @@ typedef MINCRYPT_ALLOCATE_ROUTINE* PMINCRYPT_ALLOCATE_ROUTINE;
 *
 *  @param  PublisherName[out] - publisher name.
 *
-*  @return buffer length.
+*  @return NTSTATUS. The string byte count is returned in PublisherName->Length.
+*  Free PublisherName->Buffer with the allocator paired with AllocateRoutine,
+*  including on failure if a buffer was allocated. This routine extracts a name;
+*  it does not verify the certificate or its signer.
 */
 MINCRYPTAPI
 NTSTATUS

include/Domito.h

@@ -170,8 +170,10 @@ DOMITO_CALG_TO_BCRYPT_ALGORITHM(
  */
 
 //
-// Extracts the CALG_ID from a signed PE that was used to
+// Heuristically detects the CALG_ID in the first WIN_CERTIFICATE using byte patterns.
-// calculate the message digest when it was signed
+// Returns CALG_SHA1 when absent, malformed, or unrecognized; this is not ASN.1
+// validation or signature verification. The directory array must contain the
+// IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY entry.
 //
 _IRQL_requires_max_(DISPATCH_LEVEL)
 EXTERN_C
@@ -183,7 +185,12 @@ DomitoGetPortableExecutableDigestKind(
 );
 
 //
-// Extracts Authenticode signing information and calculates the file digest of a PE file.
+// Calculates a PE digest using the existing linear hashing convention.
+// Validates accessed header/certificate ranges and clears outputs on failure
+// when all output pointers are valid. The input buffer must remain stable.
+// The returned certificate pointer borrows the input buffer; free only the digest
+// with DomitoFreePortableExecutableDigest. Algorithm detection is heuristic;
+// general section-ordered Authenticode hashing is not implemented here.
 // 
 _Success_(return == STATUS_SUCCESS)
 _Must_inspect_result_

src/Domito.CodeIntegrity.cpp

@@ -24,21 +24,26 @@ DomitoGetPortableExecutableDigestKind(
     _In_ PIMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY pImgDataDirectory
 )
 {
-    const ULONG securityRva = pImgDataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].VirtualAddress;
+    if (!pPeBytes || !pImgDataDirectory)
-
-    if (!securityRva)
     {
         return CALG_SHA1;
     }
-
+    const IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY security = pImgDataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];
-    if (securityRva > PeSize || (PeSize - securityRva) < sizeof(WIN_CERTIFICATE))
+    const ULONG securityRva = security.VirtualAddress;
+    const ULONG certificateHeaderSize = FIELD_OFFSET(WIN_CERTIFICATE, bCertificate);
+    if (!securityRva || securityRva > PeSize || security.Size > PeSize - securityRva ||
+        security.Size < certificateHeaderSize)
+    {
+        return CALG_SHA1;
+    }
+    ULONG certificateSize;
+    memcpy(&certificateSize, pPeBytes + securityRva, sizeof(certificateSize));
+    if (certificateSize < certificateHeaderSize || certificateSize > security.Size)
     {
         return CALG_SHA1;
     }
-
     const PVOID pBase = pPeBytes + securityRva;
-    const LPWIN_CERTIFICATE pCert = (WIN_CERTIFICATE*)pBase;
+    const ULONG searchLen = certificateSize;
-    const ULONG searchLen = min(pCert->dwLength, PeSize - securityRva);
     PUCHAR pMatch = NULL;
 
     if (NT_SUCCESS(DomitoMemorySearchPattern(
@@ -98,121 +103,148 @@ DomitoCalculatePortableExecutableDigest(
     _Out_ PULONG pSizeOfSecurityDirectory
 )
 {
-    PIMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY pImgDataDirectory;
+    if (!pDigestCalgOut || !pDigestSizeOut || !pDigestOut ||
-    BOOLEAN is64Bit;
+        !pCertOut || !pSizeOfSecurityDirectory)
-    PUCHAR pHash = nullptr;
+    {
-    NTSTATUS status;
+        return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
-    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE hbAlg = nullptr;
+    }
-    BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE hbHash = nullptr;
-    UINT32 hashLength = 0;
-    ULONG resultLength;
-    ULONG fileOffset = 0;
 
+    *pDigestCalgOut = 0;
+    *pDigestSizeOut = 0;
+    *pDigestOut = nullptr;
+    *pCertOut = nullptr;
+    *pSizeOfSecurityDirectory = 0;
+
+    if (!pPeBytes)
+    {
+        return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+    }
     if (PeSize < sizeof(IMAGE_DOS_HEADER))
     {
         return STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_NOT_MZ;
     }
 
-    const PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER phDos = (IMAGE_DOS_HEADER*)pPeBytes;
+    // Copy fields rather than assuming the caller's buffer is aligned.
-    if (phDos->e_magic != IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE)
+    IMAGE_DOS_HEADER dos = {};
+    memcpy(&dos, pPeBytes, sizeof(dos));
+    if (dos.e_magic != IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE)
     {
-        // Not an executable
         return STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_NOT_MZ;
     }
-
+    if (dos.e_lfanew < 0)
-    if (phDos->e_lfanew > PeSize - sizeof(IMAGE_NT_HEADERS))
     {
         return STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT;
     }
 
-    const PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS phNt = (PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS)(pPeBytes + phDos->e_lfanew);
+    const ULONG ntOffset = (ULONG)dos.e_lfanew;
-    if (phNt->Signature != IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE)
+    const ULONG ntPrefixSize = sizeof(ULONG) + sizeof(IMAGE_FILE_HEADER);
+    if (ntOffset > PeSize || ntPrefixSize > PeSize - ntOffset)
+    {
+        return STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT;
+    }
+    ULONG signature;
+    IMAGE_FILE_HEADER fileHeader;
+    memcpy(&signature, pPeBytes + ntOffset, sizeof(signature));
+    memcpy(&fileHeader, pPeBytes + ntOffset + sizeof(signature), sizeof(fileHeader));
+    if (signature != IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE)
     {
-        // Not a PE image
         return STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT;
     }
 
-    //
+    const ULONG optionalOffset = ntOffset + ntPrefixSize;
-    //	Check if PE is 32 or 64 bits
+    const ULONG optionalSize = fileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader;
-    //
+    if (optionalSize < sizeof(USHORT) || optionalSize > PeSize - optionalOffset)
-    switch (phNt->OptionalHeader.Magic)
     {
-    case IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC:
+        return STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT;
-        is64Bit = FALSE;
-        break;
-    case IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC:
-        is64Bit = TRUE;
-        break;
-    default:
-        return STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT;			// Unsupported architecture
     }
-
+    USHORT magic;
-    //
+    memcpy(&magic, pPeBytes + optionalOffset, sizeof(magic));
-    // TODO: Not sure if  16 * 512 * 512 is right. Do something better!
+    ULONG directoryOffset;
-    //
+    ULONG checksumOffset;
-    ULONG copySize = phDos->e_lfanew + sizeof(IMAGE_FILE_HEADER) + 4 + 0x40;
+    ULONG directoryCountOffset;
-#pragma warning(disable:4996)
+    if (magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC)
-    const PUCHAR pBuf = (PUCHAR)ExAllocatePoolWithTag(
-        NonPagedPoolNx,
-        16 * 512 * 512,
-        DOMITO_POOL_TAG
-    );
-#pragma warning(default:4996)
-    if (!pBuf)
     {
-        return STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
+        directoryOffset = FIELD_OFFSET(IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER32, DataDirectory);
+        checksumOffset = FIELD_OFFSET(IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER32, CheckSum);
+        directoryCountOffset = FIELD_OFFSET(IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER32, NumberOfRvaAndSizes);
     }
-
+    else if (magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC)
-    //
-    // Fetch the data directory from the PE.
-    // Note that we can also use RtlImageDirectoryEntryToData to fetch
-    // only the security directory entry but why not do it manually
-    // when we have the full PE image anyway
-    //
-    if (is64Bit == TRUE)
     {
-        pImgDataDirectory = ((PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS64)phNt)->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory;
+        directoryOffset = FIELD_OFFSET(IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER64, DataDirectory);
+        checksumOffset = FIELD_OFFSET(IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER64, CheckSum);
+        directoryCountOffset = FIELD_OFFSET(IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER64, NumberOfRvaAndSizes);
     }
     else
     {
-        pImgDataDirectory = ((PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS32)phNt)->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory;
+        return STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT;
+    }
+    if (optionalSize < directoryOffset)
+    {
+        return STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT;
+    }
+    ULONG directoryCount;
+    memcpy(&directoryCount, pPeBytes + optionalOffset + directoryCountOffset, sizeof(directoryCount));
+    if (directoryCount > (optionalSize - directoryOffset) / sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY))
+    {
+        return STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT;
     }
 
-    //
+    checksumOffset += optionalOffset;
-    // Check if the PE file contains a signature
+    const BOOLEAN hasSecurityEntry = directoryCount > IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY;
-    //
+    IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY directories[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1] = {};
-    const BOOLEAN hasEmbeddedSig = pImgDataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].VirtualAddress != 0;
+    ULONG securityEntryOffset = PeSize;
+    ULONG dataOffset = PeSize;
+    if (hasSecurityEntry)
+    {
+        securityEntryOffset = optionalOffset + directoryOffset +
+            IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY * sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY);
+        memcpy(&directories[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY], pPeBytes + securityEntryOffset,
+            sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY));
+        dataOffset = securityEntryOffset + sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY);
+    }
+    const IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY security = directories[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];
+    const BOOLEAN hasEmbeddedSig = security.VirtualAddress != 0;
+    if (hasEmbeddedSig != (security.Size != 0))
+    {
+        return STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT;
+    }
+    if (hasEmbeddedSig)
+    {
+        // The security directory contains a FILE OFFSET, not an image RVA.
+        const ULONG certificateHeaderSize = FIELD_OFFSET(WIN_CERTIFICATE, bCertificate);
+        if (security.VirtualAddress < dataOffset || security.VirtualAddress > PeSize ||
+            security.Size > PeSize - security.VirtualAddress ||
+            security.Size < certificateHeaderSize)
+        {
+            return STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT;
+        }
+        ULONG certificateSize;
+        memcpy(&certificateSize, pPeBytes + security.VirtualAddress, sizeof(certificateSize));
+        if (certificateSize < certificateHeaderSize || certificateSize > security.Size)
+        {
+            return STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT;
+        }
+    }
 
-    //
+    PUCHAR pHash = nullptr;
-    // Boring bcrypt boilerplate code
+    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE hbAlg = nullptr;
-    //
+    BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE hbHash = nullptr;
-    const UINT32 peDigestKind = DomitoGetPortableExecutableDigestKind(pPeBytes, PeSize, pImgDataDirectory);
+    ULONG hashLength = 0;
-
+    ULONG resultLength = 0;
-    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status = BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider(
+    const UINT32 peDigestKind = DomitoGetPortableExecutableDigestKind(pPeBytes, PeSize, directories);
-        &hbAlg,
+    NTSTATUS status = BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider(
-        DOMITO_CALG_TO_BCRYPT_ALGORITHM(peDigestKind), // bcrypt doesn't understand standard WinCrypt CALG IDs
+        &hbAlg, DOMITO_CALG_TO_BCRYPT_ALGORITHM(peDigestKind), MS_PRIMITIVE_PROVIDER, 0);
-        MS_PRIMITIVE_PROVIDER,
+    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
-        0
+    {
-    )))
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+    status = BCryptGetProperty(hbAlg, BCRYPT_HASH_LENGTH, (PUCHAR)&hashLength,
+        sizeof(hashLength), &resultLength, 0);
+    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
     {
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status = BCryptGetProperty(
-        hbAlg,
-        BCRYPT_HASH_LENGTH,
-        (PUCHAR)&hashLength, // put the length of the hash into hashLength
-        sizeof(hashLength),
-        &resultLength,
-        0
-    )))
-    {
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    //
-    // Allocate a buffer to store the resulting hash
-    //
 #pragma warning(disable:4996)
     pHash = (PUCHAR)ExAllocatePoolWithTag(NonPagedPoolNx, hashLength, DOMITO_POOL_TAG);
 #pragma warning(default:4996)
@@ -221,179 +253,68 @@ DomitoCalculatePortableExecutableDigest(
         status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
         goto cleanup;
     }
-    RtlZeroMemory(pHash, hashLength);
+    status = BCryptCreateHash(hbAlg, &hbHash, nullptr, 0, nullptr, 0, 0);
-
-    //
-    // Create a handle to the resulting hash
-    //
-    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status = BCryptCreateHash(
-        hbAlg,
-        &hbHash,
-        NULL,
-        0,
-        NULL,
-        0,
-        0
-    )))
-    {
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    //
-    // Ok, if we haven't BSODed yet, we're ready to continue
-    // parsing the PE/COFF and hash the needed values
-    //
-    memcpy(pBuf, pPeBytes, copySize);
-    fileOffset += copySize;
-
-    //
-    // Hash everything up to the Checksum then skip it
-    //
-    status = BCryptHashData(
-        hbHash,
-        pBuf,
-        copySize,
-        0
-    );
     if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
     {
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    fileOffset += 4; // Skipping the checksum field here
+    // Keep the existing linear hashing convention, but hash validated ranges
-
+    // directly: no fixed-size scratch buffer and no unchecked memcpy lengths.
-    //
+    // General section-ordered Authenticode hashing is a separate change.
-    // Reach the security directory information.
+    status = BCryptHashData(hbHash, pPeBytes, checksumOffset, 0);
-    // For x64 PEs it's 10 bytes further
+    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
-    //
-    copySize = 0x3C;
-    if (is64Bit == TRUE)
     {
-        copySize += 0x10;
+        goto cleanup;
     }
-
+    status = BCryptHashData(hbHash, pPeBytes + checksumOffset + sizeof(ULONG),
-    memcpy(pBuf, pPeBytes + fileOffset, copySize);
+        securityEntryOffset - checksumOffset - sizeof(ULONG), 0);
-    fileOffset += copySize;
+    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
-
+    {
-    //
+        goto cleanup;
-    // Again, hash everything up to here then skip the ignored field.
+    }
-    //
+    if (hasSecurityEntry)
-    status = BCryptHashData(
+    {
-        hbHash,
+        status = BCryptHashData(hbHash, pPeBytes + dataOffset,
-        pBuf,
+            (hasEmbeddedSig ? security.VirtualAddress : PeSize) - dataOffset, 0);
-        copySize,
+        if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
-        0
+        {
-    );
+            goto cleanup;
+        }
+    }
+    status = BCryptFinishHash(hbHash, pHash, hashLength, 0);
     if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
     {
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    fileOffset += 8; // Skipping an other ignored field here
-
-    //
-    // Now hash everything else in the file up to the certificate data.
-    //
-    ULONG remaining;
-    if (hasEmbeddedSig)
-    {
-        const ULONG secRva = pImgDataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].VirtualAddress;
-        if (secRva < fileOffset)
-        {
-            status = STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT;
-            goto cleanup;
-        }
-        remaining = secRva - fileOffset;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-        remaining = (fileOffset <= PeSize) ? (PeSize - fileOffset) : 0;
-    }
-
-    while (remaining > 0)
-    {
-        const ULONG chunkSize = min(remaining, 4096);
-        ULONG readBytes;
-        memset(pBuf, 0, chunkSize);
-
-        if (fileOffset + chunkSize > PeSize)
-        {
-            readBytes = PeSize - chunkSize;
-            memcpy(pBuf, pPeBytes + fileOffset, readBytes);
-            fileOffset += readBytes;
-            break;
-        }
-        else
-        {
-            memcpy(pBuf, pPeBytes + fileOffset, chunkSize);
-            readBytes = chunkSize;
-            fileOffset += readBytes;
-        }
-
-        if (!NT_SUCCESS(status = BCryptHashData(
-            hbHash,
-            pBuf,
-            readBytes,
-            0
-        )))
-        {
-            goto cleanup;
-        }
-
-        remaining -= readBytes;
-    }
-
-    //
-    // Finish up the hash here
-    //
-    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status = BCryptFinishHash(
-        hbHash,
-        pHash,
-        hashLength,
-        0
-    )))
-    {
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    //
-    // Supply the results to the caller
-    //
     *pDigestCalgOut = peDigestKind;
     *pDigestSizeOut = hashLength;
     *pDigestOut = pHash;
-    if (hasEmbeddedSig == TRUE)
+    pHash = nullptr; // Transfer ownership only after all work has succeeded.
+    if (hasEmbeddedSig)
     {
-        *pCertOut = (LPWIN_CERTIFICATE)(pPeBytes + pImgDataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].VirtualAddress);
+        *pCertOut = (LPWIN_CERTIFICATE)(pPeBytes + security.VirtualAddress);
-        *pSizeOfSecurityDirectory = pImgDataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size;
+        *pSizeOfSecurityDirectory = security.Size;
     }
-    else
-    {
-        *pCertOut = NULL;
-        *pSizeOfSecurityDirectory = 0;
-    }
-
-    status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
 
 cleanup:
-    if (pBuf)
-    {
-        ExFreePoolWithTag(pBuf, DOMITO_POOL_TAG);
-    }
-
     if (hbHash)
     {
         BCryptDestroyHash(hbHash);
     }
-
+    if (pHash)
+    {
+        ExFreePoolWithTag(pHash, DOMITO_POOL_TAG);
+    }
     if (hbAlg)
     {
         BCryptCloseAlgorithmProvider(hbAlg, 0);
     }
-
     return status;
 }
 
+
 _IRQL_requires_max_(DISPATCH_LEVEL)
 void
 DomitoFreePortableExecutableDigest(
@@ -493,6 +414,12 @@ DomitoValidateFileLegacyMode(
                 break;
             }
 
+            if (ioStatusBlock.Information != SecurityDirectory->Size)
+            {
+                status = STATUS_END_OF_FILE;
+                break;
+            }
+
             KeStackAttachProcess(PsInitialSystemProcess, &systemContext);
             {
                 status = CiCheckSignedFile(

tests/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# Code Integrity regression tests
+
+From an **x64 Visual Studio developer shell**, with the Windows SDK and Python 3:
+
+```powershell
+python tests\run-digest-tests.py
+```
+
+The runner extracts the production digest, pattern-search, algorithm-mapping,
+and legacy-validation functions without changing their bodies. The C++ harness
+uses real user-mode BCrypt hashing and test doubles for pool allocation, file
+reads, and CI. No driver is installed or loaded. Build outputs are temporary.
+
+Coverage includes PE32/PE32+ digest fixtures, checksum and certificate exclusions,
+a DOS stub larger than 4 MiB, truncated headers next to inaccessible guard pages,
+invalid offsets and lengths, absent security-directory entries, injected hashing
+and allocation failures, deterministic failure outputs, allocation ownership,
+and rejection of successful-but-short certificate reads before invoking CI.
+
+The tests do not validate CI trust policy, asynchronous kernel I/O behavior, or
+general Authenticode hashing of unusual section layouts. The digest implementation
+still uses its existing linear byte-order convention and heuristic signature
+algorithm detection; replacing those requires a separate compatibility corpus.

tests/digest-tests.cpp

@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
+// User-mode regression harness. The runner extracts the production functions
+// unchanged; pool, file-I/O, and CI calls are test doubles. BCrypt is real CNG.
+#define WIN32_NO_STATUS
+#include <windows.h>
+#undef WIN32_NO_STATUS
+#include <ntstatus.h>
+#include <bcrypt.h>
+#include <wintrust.h>
+#include <cstdio>
+#include <cstdlib>
+#include <vector>
+#include <cstring>
+
+#define NT_SUCCESS(s) (((NTSTATUS)(s)) >= 0)
+#define ASSERT(x) Check(!!(x), #x)
+#define DOMITO_POOL_TAG 0x446f6d69
+#define NonPagedPoolNx 0
+#define PagedPool 1
+#define PAGED_CODE() ((void)0)
+#define MINCRYPT_SHA1_LENGTH 20
+#define MINCRYPT_SHA256_LENGTH 32
+typedef const UCHAR* PCUCHAR;
+
+static unsigned checks, allocations, ciCalls, hashCalls;
+static int failOperation, failHashCall;
+static ULONG_PTR bytesRead;
+static void Check(bool ok, const char* message)
+{
+    ++checks;
+    if (!ok) { std::fprintf(stderr, "FAIL: %s\n", message); std::exit(1); }
+}
+static PVOID ExAllocatePoolWithTag(int, SIZE_T size, ULONG)
+{
+    if (failOperation == 4) return nullptr;
+    void* p = HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), 0, size);
+    if (p) ++allocations;
+    return p;
+}
+static void ExFreePoolWithTag(PVOID p, ULONG)
+{
+    Check(p != nullptr && allocations != 0, "allocation ownership");
+    --allocations;
+    Check(HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, p) != FALSE, "heap free");
+}
+static NTSTATUS TestCreateHash(BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE a, BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE* h,
+    PUCHAR o, ULONG os, PUCHAR s, ULONG ss, ULONG f)
+{
+    if (failOperation == 1) return STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
+    return BCryptCreateHash(a, h, o, os, s, ss, f);
+}
+static NTSTATUS TestHashData(BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE h, PUCHAR b, ULONG n, ULONG f)
+{
+    ++hashCalls;
+    if (failOperation == 2 && hashCalls == (unsigned)failHashCall) return STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
+    return BCryptHashData(h, b, n, f);
+}
+static NTSTATUS TestFinishHash(BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE h, PUCHAR b, ULONG n, ULONG f)
+{
+    if (failOperation == 3) return STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
+    return BCryptFinishHash(h, b, n, f);
+}
+
+// Minimal dependencies for the legacy wrapper; no actual CI code is invoked.
+struct MINCRYPT_POLICY_INFO { ULONG Size; };
+struct KAPC_STATE { ULONG unused; };
+struct IO_STATUS_BLOCK { NTSTATUS Status; ULONG_PTR Information; };
+static PVOID PsInitialSystemProcess = nullptr;
+static void CiFreePolicyInfo(MINCRYPT_POLICY_INFO* p) { p->Size = 0; }
+static void KeStackAttachProcess(PVOID, KAPC_STATE*) {}
+static void KeUnstackDetachProcess(KAPC_STATE*) {}
+static NTSTATUS ZwReadFile(HANDLE, PVOID, PVOID, PVOID, IO_STATUS_BLOCK* io,
+    PVOID buffer, ULONG size, LARGE_INTEGER*, PVOID)
+{
+    io->Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
+    io->Information = bytesRead;
+    std::memset(buffer, 0, (size_t)min(bytesRead, (ULONG_PTR)size));
+    return STATUS_SUCCESS;
+}
+static NTSTATUS ZwWaitForSingleObject(HANDLE, BOOLEAN, PVOID) { return STATUS_SUCCESS; }
+static NTSTATUS CiCheckSignedFile(PVOID, UINT32, ALG_ID, PVOID, UINT32,
+    MINCRYPT_POLICY_INFO*, LARGE_INTEGER*, MINCRYPT_POLICY_INFO*)
+{
+    ++ciCalls;
+    return STATUS_SUCCESS;
+}
+static NTSTATUS CiVerifyHashInCatalog(PVOID, UINT32, ALG_ID, BOOLEAN, UINT32, UINT32,
+    MINCRYPT_POLICY_INFO*, PVOID, LARGE_INTEGER*, MINCRYPT_POLICY_INFO*)
+{
+    ++ciCalls;
+    return STATUS_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+#define BCryptCreateHash TestCreateHash
+#define BCryptHashData TestHashData
+#define BCryptFinishHash TestFinishHash
+#include "digest-under-test.inc"
+#undef BCryptCreateHash
+#undef BCryptHashData
+#undef BCryptFinishHash
+
+static std::vector<UCHAR> Image(bool pe64, ULONG nt = 128, bool certificate = false)
+{
+    std::vector<UCHAR> b((size_t)nt + 896 + (certificate ? 32 : 0), 0);
+    IMAGE_DOS_HEADER dos = {};
+    dos.e_magic = IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE; dos.e_lfanew = (LONG)nt;
+    std::memcpy(b.data(), &dos, sizeof(dos));
+    ULONG signature = IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE;
+    std::memcpy(b.data() + nt, &signature, sizeof(signature));
+    IMAGE_FILE_HEADER f = {};
+    f.NumberOfSections = 1;
+    f.SizeOfOptionalHeader = pe64 ? sizeof(IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER64) : sizeof(IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER32);
+    std::memcpy(b.data() + nt + 4, &f, sizeof(f));
+    IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER64 h64 = {};
+    IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER32 h32 = {};
+    h64.Magic = IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC; h32.Magic = IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC;
+    h64.NumberOfRvaAndSizes = h32.NumberOfRvaAndSizes = 16;
+    h64.SizeOfHeaders = h32.SizeOfHeaders = nt + 384;
+    if (certificate)
+    {
+        h64.DataDirectory[4] = h32.DataDirectory[4] = { nt + 896, 32 };
+        ULONG length = 32;
+        std::memcpy(b.data() + nt + 896, &length, sizeof(length));
+    }
+    std::memcpy(b.data() + nt + 24, pe64 ? (void*)&h64 : (void*)&h32, f.SizeOfOptionalHeader);
+    IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER section = {};
+    section.PointerToRawData = nt + 384; section.SizeOfRawData = 512;
+    std::memcpy(b.data() + nt + 24 + f.SizeOfOptionalHeader, &section, sizeof(section));
+    for (ULONG i = nt + 384; i < nt + 896; ++i) b[i] = (UCHAR)(i * 31);
+    return b;
+}
+static void Set32(std::vector<UCHAR>& b, size_t at, ULONG value)
+{
+    std::memcpy(b.data() + at, &value, sizeof(value));
+}
+static void Set16(std::vector<UCHAR>& b, size_t at, USHORT value)
+{
+    std::memcpy(b.data() + at, &value, sizeof(value));
+}
+static std::vector<UCHAR> Digest(PUCHAR b, ULONG size, NTSTATUS expected = STATUS_SUCCESS)
+{
+    UINT32 algorithm = 0xdead;
+    ULONG length = 0xdead, certSize = 0xdead;
+    PVOID digest = (void*)1;
+    LPWIN_CERTIFICATE cert = (LPWIN_CERTIFICATE)1;
+    hashCalls = 0;
+    NTSTATUS s = DomitoCalculatePortableExecutableDigest(b, size, &algorithm, &length,
+        &digest, &cert, &certSize);
+    Check(s == expected, "digest status");
+    std::vector<UCHAR> result;
+    if (NT_SUCCESS(s))
+    {
+        Check(algorithm == CALG_SHA1 && length == 20 && digest != nullptr, "SHA1 output");
+        Check((cert == nullptr) == (certSize == 0), "certificate outputs agree");
+        if (cert) Check((PUCHAR)cert >= b && (PUCHAR)cert + certSize <= b + size, "borrowed certificate span");
+        result.assign((PUCHAR)digest, (PUCHAR)digest + length);
+        DomitoFreePortableExecutableDigest(digest);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        Check(!algorithm && !length && !digest && !cert && !certSize, "failure outputs cleared");
+    }
+    Check(allocations == 0, "no leaked pool allocations");
+    return result;
+}
+static std::vector<UCHAR> Reference(const std::vector<UCHAR>& b, ULONG checksum,
+    ULONG securitySlot, ULONG end)
+{
+    // Explicit fixture ranges, independent of the production parser.
+    std::vector<UCHAR> bytes(b.begin(), b.begin() + checksum);
+    bytes.insert(bytes.end(), b.begin() + checksum + 4, b.begin() + securitySlot);
+    if (securitySlot != end) bytes.insert(bytes.end(), b.begin() + securitySlot + 8, b.begin() + end);
+    std::vector<UCHAR> digest(20);
+    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE algorithm = nullptr;
+    Check(NT_SUCCESS(BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider(&algorithm, BCRYPT_SHA1_ALGORITHM, nullptr, 0)), "reference algorithm");
+    Check(NT_SUCCESS(BCryptHash(algorithm, nullptr, 0, bytes.data(), (ULONG)bytes.size(), digest.data(), 20)), "reference digest");
+    BCryptCloseAlgorithmProvider(algorithm, 0);
+    return digest;
+}
+static void GuardedInvalid(const std::vector<UCHAR>& b, NTSTATUS expected)
+{
+    SYSTEM_INFO si; GetSystemInfo(&si);
+    const SIZE_T span = ((b.size() + si.dwPageSize - 1) / si.dwPageSize) * si.dwPageSize;
+    UCHAR* region = (UCHAR*)VirtualAlloc(nullptr, span + si.dwPageSize, MEM_RESERVE | MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_READWRITE);
+    Check(region != nullptr, "guard allocation");
+    DWORD old;
+    Check(VirtualProtect(region + span, si.dwPageSize, PAGE_NOACCESS, &old) != FALSE, "guard protection");
+    UCHAR* input = region + span - b.size();
+    std::memcpy(input, b.data(), b.size());
+    Digest(input, (ULONG)b.size(), expected);
+    VirtualFree(region, 0, MEM_RELEASE);
+}
+int main()
+{
+    for (bool pe64 : {false, true})
+    {
+        for (bool certificate : {false, true})
+        {
+            auto b = Image(pe64, 128, certificate);
+            auto result = Digest(b.data(), (ULONG)b.size());
+            Check(result == Reference(b, 216, pe64 ? 296 : 280, 1024), "fixture digest equals independent CNG reference");
+            Set32(b, 216, 0x12345678);
+            Check(result == Digest(b.data(), (ULONG)b.size()), "checksum excluded");
+            if (certificate)
+            {
+                b.back() ^= 0x55;
+                Check(result == Digest(b.data(), (ULONG)b.size()), "certificate contents excluded");
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    auto large = Image(true, 4 * 1024 * 1024);
+    Check(Digest(large.data(), (ULONG)large.size()) == Reference(large, 4194392, 4194472, (ULONG)large.size()), "large DOS stub");
+    auto b = Image(true);
+    for (ULONG size = 0; size < 392; ++size)
+    {
+        std::vector<UCHAR> prefix(b.begin(), b.begin() + size);
+        if (size == 0) Digest(b.data(), 0, STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_NOT_MZ);
+        else GuardedInvalid(prefix, size < 64 ? STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_NOT_MZ : STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT);
+    }
+    auto bad = b; Set32(bad, 60, 0xffffffff); GuardedInvalid(bad, STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT);
+    bad = b; Set32(bad, 60, 0x7fffffff); GuardedInvalid(bad, STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT);
+    bad = b; Set16(bad, 148, 1); GuardedInvalid(bad, STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT);
+    bad = b; Set16(bad, 152, 0x999); GuardedInvalid(bad, STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT);
+    bad = b; Set32(bad, 260, 17); GuardedInvalid(bad, STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT);
+    for (ULONG offset : {200UL, 2048UL, 0xffffffffUL})
+    {
+        bad = b; Set32(bad, 296, offset); Set32(bad, 300, 32); GuardedInvalid(bad, STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT);
+    }
+    bad = b; Set32(bad, 300, 32); GuardedInvalid(bad, STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT);
+    bad = b; Set32(bad, 296, 800); GuardedInvalid(bad, STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT);
+    bad = b; Set32(bad, 296, 800); Set32(bad, 300, 0xffffffff); GuardedInvalid(bad, STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT);
+    bad = Image(true, 128, true); Set32(bad, 1024, 33); GuardedInvalid(bad, STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT);
+    bad = Image(true, 128, true); Set32(bad, 1024, 7); GuardedInvalid(bad, STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT);
+    bad = Image(true); Set32(bad, 260, 0); // No directory entry: don't exclude its physical bytes.
+    Check(Digest(bad.data(), (ULONG)bad.size()) == Reference(bad, 216, 1024, 1024), "absent security directory");
+    for (int failure : {1, 2, 3, 4})
+    {
+        failOperation = failure;
+        for (int call = 1; call <= (failure == 2 ? 3 : 1); ++call)
+        {
+            failHashCall = call;
+            Digest(b.data(), (ULONG)b.size(), failure == 4 ? STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES : STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL);
+        }
+    }
+    failOperation = 0;
+    Digest(nullptr, 1024, STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+    IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY directory = {1024, 32};
+    MINCRYPT_POLICY_INFO policy = {}, timestamp = {};
+    LARGE_INTEGER signing = {};
+    UCHAR hash[20] = {};
+    bytesRead = 16; ciCalls = 0;
+    Check(DomitoValidateFileLegacyMode(nullptr, hash, 20, CALG_SHA1, &directory,
+        &policy, &signing, &timestamp) == STATUS_END_OF_FILE, "short certificate read rejected");
+    Check(ciCalls == 0 && allocations == 0, "short read does not reach CI or leak");
+    bytesRead = 32;
+    Check(NT_SUCCESS(DomitoValidateFileLegacyMode(nullptr, hash, 20, CALG_SHA1, &directory,
+        &policy, &signing, &timestamp)), "complete certificate read accepted");
+    Check(ciCalls == 1 && allocations == 0, "complete read reaches CI once");
+    std::printf("PASS: %u checks (guarded malformed inputs, PE32/PE32+, CNG digests, failure cleanup, short reads).\n", checks);
+}

tests/run-digest-tests.py

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+"""Run in an x64 VS developer shell with Windows SDK and Python 3 installed.
+
+Extracts the actual production functions without changing their bodies, replacing
+only kernel dependencies with the test harness. No driver is loaded. This tests
+parsing, hashing and cleanup, not real CI policy or kernel I/O synchronization.
+"""
+import argparse
+from pathlib import Path
+import subprocess
+import tempfile
+
+parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+parser.add_argument('--source-root', type=Path, default=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1])
+parser.add_argument('--digest-source', type=Path)
+args = parser.parse_args()
+root = args.source_root
+digest = (args.digest_source or root / 'src/Domito.CodeIntegrity.cpp').read_text(encoding='utf-8-sig')
+digest = digest.replace('#include "Domito.Internal.h"', '').replace('#include "Domito.MinCrypt.h"', '')
+common = (root / 'src/Domito.cpp').read_text(encoding='utf-8-sig')
+start = common.rfind('_Success_', 0, common.index('DomitoMemorySearchPattern('))
+end = common.index('_Success_', common.index('DomitoMemorySearchPattern('))
+search = common[start:end]
+public = (root / 'include/Domito.h').read_text(encoding='utf-8-sig')
+start = public.index('#if !defined(CALG_SHA1)')
+end = public.index('/*', public.index('DOMITO_CALG_TO_BCRYPT_ALGORITHM('))
+algorithm = public[start:end]
+with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix='domito-digest-tests-') as temp:
+    build = Path(temp)
+    (build / 'digest-under-test.inc').write_text(algorithm + '\n' + search + '\n' + digest, encoding='utf-8')
+    test_source = Path(__file__).with_name('digest-tests.cpp')
+    subprocess.run(['cl', '/nologo', '/EHsc', '/W4', '/WX', '/std:c++17',
+                    '/I' + str(build), str(test_source), '/Fe' + str(build/'digest-tests.exe'),
+                    '/Fo' + str(build/'digest-tests.obj'), '/link', 'bcrypt.lib'], cwd=build, check=True)
+    subprocess.run([str(build/'digest-tests.exe')], cwd=build, check=True)